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Watson Rounds v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 79 (Sept. 24, 2015)1
SANCTIONS: NRS § 7.085 AND NRCP 11 MECHANISMS; DISTRICT COURT’S ABUSE
OF DISCRETION
Summary
NRS 7.085 allows a district court to make an attorney personally liable for the attorney
fees and costs an opponent incurs when the attorney files, maintains or defends a civil action that
is not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for
changing the existing law.2 The Court considered (1) whether NRCP 113 supersedes NRS 7.085
in sanctioning a law firm and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning
the law firm under under NRS 7.085. The Court held NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085
because each represents an independent method for sanctioning attorneys. The Court also found
the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning the petitioner under NRS § 7.085 without
making adequate findings.
Background
In 2011, FortuNet, Inc. filed an initial complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court
alleging former employees breached duties and improperly used FortuNet’s intellectual property.
FortuNet later retained petitioner, Watson Rounds, P.C. who filed a second amended complaint
on behalf of FortuNet, adding Himelfarb & Associates, LLC, and its president, Bruce Himelfarb,
as defendants. FortuNet’s claims against the newly named defendants alleged a kickback scheme
and theft of FortuNet’s intellectual property.
The district court dismissed several of FortuNet’s claims for lack of evidence under
NRCP 50(a). Additionally, FortuNet voluntarily dismissed some of its claims against Himelfarb
and Himelfarb & Associates. The rest of FortuNet’s claims made it to the jury. The jury rejected
these remaining claims against Himelfarb and Himelfarb & Associates, found for Himelfarb and
Himelfarb & Associates on its counterclaims, and asked the district court if it could include these
defendants’ attorney’s fees when calculating damages. The district court instructed the jury it
could not include attorney’s fees into its damages calculation because those fees would be
assessed after the trial’s conclusion.
The district court held FortuNet liable for Himelfarb’s attorney’s fees, totaling
$551,216.38. Additionally, pursuant to NRS § 7.085, the district court found Watson was jointly
and severally liable with FortuNet for the fees. The district court premised Watson’s liability on
its determination that Watson maintained FortuNet’s claims against Himelfarb and Himelfarb &
Associates, as well as defended FortuNet against Himelfarb and Himelfarb & Associate’s
counterclaims, “despite not being well-grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or
good faith argument for a change in existing law.”
Further, pursuant to NRS § 7.085, the district court sanctioned Watson “based on (1) its
review of the various pre-trial motions, (2) the evidence presented at trial, (3) NRCP 50(a)
rulings, (4) FortuNet’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice of certain claims, (5) the jury’s
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unanimous verdict in favor of [Himelfarb], (6) the jury’s expressed desire to award [Himelfarb
its] entire attorney’s fees incurred relating to this case,” (7) the testimony of FortuNet’s CEO and
principal witness, who stated Watson “was responsible for 99.99% of the factual and legal
content of FortuNet’s pleadings,” and (8) the district court’s determination “that Watson could
not have made the required inquiries . . . [and] could not have reassessed the evidentiary support
for FortuNet’s claims before filing [the second amended complaint] . . . and could not have had a
reasonable belief that the claims against [Himelfarb] were well-grounded in either fact or law.”
Discussion
Watson sought a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order making it liable for
Himelfarb’s and Himelfarb & Associate’s attorney’s fees. Watson argued (1) the court should
exercise its discretion to consider Watson’s petition; (2) NRCP 11 supersedes NRS § 7.085,
making the district court’s award improper; and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it
made Watson liable for Himelfarb’s and Himelfarb & Associate’s attorney’s fees without first
making adequate findings.
This court will exercise its discretion to consider Watson’s petition
The Court has discretion to issue extraordinary writs.4 The Court generally exercises this
discretion when a party does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Where a party
is able to appeal a final judgment in the future, the party generally has an adequate and speedy
legal remedy, which precludes writ relief. 5 However, a sanctioned attorney lacks standing to
appeal because the attorney is not a party in the underlying action, which makes writs the proper
avenue for an attorney seeking sanction review.6 Here, Watson was not a party to the underlying
action and cannot appeal the district court’s order. This entitled Watson to seek a writ of
mandamus.
NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS 7.085
Watson argued that, because NRS § 7.085 is a statute that was last amended in 2003 and
NRCP 11 is a procedural rule that was last amended in 2004, NRCP 11 supersedes NRS § 7.085,
or, alternatively, NRS § 7.085 now incorporates NRCP 11’s safe harbor provisions. NRCP 11’s
2004 amendment added safe harbor provisions preventing attorneys from being sanctioned until
they are able to cure the sanctionable conduct or appear at a show cause hearing. Watson relied
on State v. Connery for this argument.7 There, the Court addressed whether a statute or a laterenacted appellate rule governed time for an appeal. 8 The rule and statute in Connery were
irreconcilable because each provided different start dates to calculated a thirty-day window for
appeal. 9 The Court held the procedural rule superseded the statute. 10 Here, the Court
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distinguished Connery from Watson’s case because Watson did not provide any justification as
to why NRCP 11 and NRS § 7.085 could not be read in harmony.
The Court next looked to federal authority for indication that NRCP 11 does not
supersede NRS § 7.085. Nevada adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their entirety in
1993. The 1993 Advisory Committee Notes provide that FRCP 11 does not supersede 28 USC §
1927, a statute that “makes attorneys personally liable for the unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of proceedings.” Further, federal courts recognize that FRCP 11 and § 1927
“apply to different types of misconduct and provide independent mechanisms for sanctioning
attorney conduct.” Following this line of reasoning, the Court found the relationship between
NRCP 11 and NRS § 7.085 comparable to the relationship between FRCP 11 and § 1927.
Lastly, the Court looked to Nevada’s statutory interpretation rules to support its
conclusion that NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085. A court will read a rule or statute in
harmony with other rules or statutes whenever possible.11 Therefore, the Court found that NRCP
11 does not supersede NRS § 7.085 because it appropriate to “treat the rule and statute as
independent methods for district courts to award attorneys fees for misconduct.”
The district court failed to make adequate findings supporting sanctions against Watson
The Court held the district court’s findings were insufficient to support a conclusion that
Watson violated NRS § 7.085. First, it was improper for the district court to rely on the jury’s
question about awarding attorney’s fees for FortuNet’s breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. NRS § 7.085 does not empower juries to sanction attorneys and there is no
authority indicating Watson could be liable for damages resulting from its client’s breach.
Second, the district court’s order contains several conclusions unsupported by sufficient factual
detail and reasoning, making it impossible to meaningfully review the sanctions. Third, “it is not
clear the NRCP 50(a) rulings and FortuNet’s voluntary dismissal of some claims support an
award for attorney fees.” Lastly, FortuNet’s CEO’s testimony does not explain why the award
against Watson is justified. This evidence blames Watson for “any groundlessness that might
have existed,” but does not say anything about whether the claims were well grounded in fact or
law. Therefore, the Court found the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Watson.
Conclusion
The Court exercised its discretion to hear Watson’s writ petition because, as a nonparty to
the underlying action, Watson is unable to appeal the district court’s order. NRCP 11 does not
supersede NRS § 7.085 because they are distinct mechanisms for sanctioning attorney
misconduct. The district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Watson pursuant to NRS §
7.085 because its order did not sufficiently explain why Watson should be liable for attorney
fees. The Court ordered the clerk to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to
vacate the portion of its order holding Watson jointly and severally liable for attorney fees and
costs.
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